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CASE COMMENT

MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING-PROSECUTORIAL BURDEN
AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT'S IMPACT ON
FORENSIC ANALYSIS
Bullcoming v. NewMexico, 131 S.Ct. 2705 (2011)
Tyler J.Hudson*

Petitioner was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI), a charge
confirmed by a forensic analysis of his blood.' This analysis was
documented in a certified lab report signed by an analyst.2 At trial, the
prosecutor introduced the lab report as evidence but called a different
analyst as a witness.3 Petitioner objected, arguing that the surrogate
witness violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 4 ; the
trial judge overruled the objection.5 Both the New Mexico Court of
Appeals and the New Mexico Supreme Court decision affirmed the trial
ruling. 6 The U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to the New
Mexico Supreme Court and HELD, that the Sixth Amendment is
violated when a defendant is unable to confront the analyst that
prepared a forensic report used as evidence against the defendant, unless
the analyst is7 unavailable and there was prior opportunity for crossexamination.
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "the
accused shall enjoy the right ...

to be confronted with the witnesses

* The author is a J.D. Candidate at the University of Florida Levin College of Law
(2013) and received a B.A. in Philosophy from the George Washington University (2007). The
author's piece won the 2012 Huber C. Hurst award for best submission in the University of
FloridaJournalof Law and Public Policy's Summer/Fall Case Comment Writing Competition,
hosted annually for second-year law students.
I Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2709 (2011). Petitioner's blood alcohol
content (BAC) was determined by an analysis of his blood because he "refused to take a breath
test." Id. at 2710.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 2711-12.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him.").
5. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2712.
6. Id.
7. Id. at2713.
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against him,"8 a right applicable to the states as well. 9 Interpreted
literally and narrowly, the Confrontation Clause would create an
impractical right due to the impossibility of a human declarant
accompanying each testimonial statement introduced at trial. 10
Accordingly, common law has permitted exceptions to the traditional
rule that hearsay-a statement introduced without accompanying
testimony"-is inadmissible. 12 In Ohio v. Roberts, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a witness statement made at a preliminary hearing,
without cross-examination, was admissible during a criminal trial
because it bore an "indicia of reliability."' 3 This reliability can be
determined either by pointing to
an established hearsay exception or
"guarantees of trustworthiness."' 14
Twenty-four years later, in Crawford v. Washington, the U.S.
Supreme Court abrogated the Roberts decision, holding that 'reliability'
was both too broad and too narrow a criterion to protect a defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights.' 5 In Crawford, the defendant was charged
with stabbing another man; the defendant's wife witnessed the stabbing
and her statement to the police was recorded.' 6 The trial court admitted
the recorded statement as evidence, without accompanying testimony
from the defendant's wife, and held that the statement's reliability was
proven by its guarantee of trustworthiness.' 7 While the Washington
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, the Washington
Supreme Court upheld the conviction,
agreeing that the statement did
8
have guarantees of trustworthiness.'
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the9
Washington Supreme Court decision violated the Sixth Amendment.'
After an extensive historical analysis of the amendment, the Court drew
two conclusions: (1) testimonial hearsay is a primary focus of the Sixth
Amendment and (2) testimonial statements of absent witnesses were
only admissible if the witness was unavailable at trial, but previously
available for cross-examination. 20 The Court eschewed the reliability
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

9. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
10.

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980), abrogatedby Crawford v. Washington, 541

U.S. 36 (2004).
11.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 790 (9th ed. 2009).

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64-65.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Crawford,541 U.S. at 60.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id.

19.
20.

Id. at 42.
Id. at 53-54.
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criterion announced in Roberts and reversed the decision of the
Washington Supreme Court, holding that testimonial statements can
only be admitted without a witness only if the witness is unavailable
and there had been a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 2
Recently, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that laboratory analysts, who sign a report that is admitted as
evidence, qualify as witnesses for purposes of the Confrontation
Clause. At trial, the state introduced "certificates of analysis" which
23
proved that the white powder seized from the defendant was cocaine.
Petitioner objected and argued that the Sixth Amendment required the
analysts to testify in person. 24 The Appeals Court of Massachusetts
26
affirmed the conviction, 25 relying on an earlier Massachusetts case
which held that forensic analysts are not witnesses
under the Sixth
27
Amendment when they merely sign certificates.
The Melendez-Diaz majority declined to support the dissent's
conception of analysts as automatons who merely convey scientificallyneutral data. 28 To the contrary, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
analysts, as humans, are prone to human error, which may be the basis
for a defense and thus qualify the analysts as witnesses under the
Confrontation Clause. 29 The Court refused to interpret the analysts'
certificates as official business records, which typically enjoy an
exception to the rule that hearsay is inadmissible.30 Finally, the Court
noted that its decision did not impose the severe burden on prosecutors
that the respondent and dissenting justices claimed it did. 3 1 By reversing
the decision of the Appeals Court of Massachusetts, the Court set in
motion an active debate over the prosecutorial
burden imposed by its
32
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
The instant case reaffirmed the rule that forensic analysts who certify
testimonial laboratory reports are witnesses under the Sixth
Amendment. Throughout its holding, the instant Court grappled with
familiar arguments, including: (1) analysts simply transmit information
that is not testimonial in character, (2) a lab report itself is not
testimonial, and (3) a nuanced interpretation of the Sixth Amendment is
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 68.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009).
Id. at 2531.
Id.

25.

Id.

26.

Commonwealth v. Verde, 444 Mass. 279 (2005).

27.

Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 2536.
Id. at 2532.
Id. at 2538.
Id. at2541.
Id. at 2541-42.
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required to prevent placing an unfair burden on prosecutors. 33 The New
Mexico Supreme Court relied heavily on the first two arguments in
holding that the trial
judge complied with the demands of the
34
Confrontation Clause.
The majority took issue with all three of these arguments,
particularly the first two, which formed the basis of the New Mexico's
Supreme Court reasoning. In rejecting the argument that the analyst was
a mere transcriber, the instant Court noted that the role of the analyst
35
was to use his judgment, even if in the course of a routine procedure.
The Court also noted that if the defense wished to raise questions about
the analyst's performance of the procedure, there was no one to ask but
the analyst himself.36 A surrogate analyst simply cannot answer
questions about an analysis that he or she performed; therefore, the
surrogate analyst in the instant case does not meet the Sixth Amendment
standard for 'witness. 37
The issue that most divided the instant Court was whether the
majority's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment placed an
unnecessary burden on prosecutors. 38 The dissenting justices
vehemently disagreed with the majority, arguing that the decision39
eviscerated the states' ability to craft their own evidentiary rules.
Noting that the dissent of the instant case is similar to the dissent in
Melendez-Diaz, the majority anticipated the argument, and offers a
simple rejoinder: convenience does not justify infidelity to
constitutional demands.4 °
A tension between formalism and functionalism runs through the
Court's decision in Crawford and its progeny. On the one hand, the
majorities in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming construe the questions
presented as an inquiry into constitutional demands and conclude that
the Sixth Amendment's protections are indeed durable. On the other
hand, the dissenting justices in the same two cases view the
constitutional demands as less stringent, thus affording the states ample
leeway to craft laws that best suit them. Accordingly, Melendez-Diaz
33. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2714-17 (2011).
34. Id. at 2712-13. In holding that the trial court complied with the demands of the
Confrontation Clause, the New Mexico Supreme Court reasoned that the unavailable analyst
"'was a mere scrivener,' who 'simply transcribed the results generated by the gas
chromatograph machine."' Further, the New Mexico Supreme Court reasoned that "although
[the surrogate analyst] did not participate in testing [Petitioner]'s blood," the surrogate analyst
"qualified as an expert witness with respect to the gas chromatograph machine."' Id. at 2713.
35. ld. at2715.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2717-18.
39. Id. at 2727 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 2717-18 (majority opinion).
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and Bullcoming reveal a conflict between formalism and functionalism
that is already familiar to the Court.
The analysis of the majority and dissent begin, and diverge, with the
decision in Crawford seven years earlier. While the majority sees a
decision confirming the durability and reach of the Confrontation
Clause, the dissent sees an embrace of federalism and judicial modesty.
The two sides also view the forensic technology differently, with the
majority emphasizing the human analyst's role in guiding the machine,
and the dissent characterizing the analyst's role as more ancillary and
subordinate. These differing viewpoints on the technology are
significant because they shape one's analysis of the chain of custody
questions presented by evidentiary issues.
Whether the majority opinion of the instant case will burden
prosecutors is a clear point of disagreement. The majority raises one
issue that sheds doubt on the dissent's prediction of prosecutorial
burden: re-testing. 41 Noting that New Mexico, like many states,
preserves original forensic samples, the majority implies that the states'
ability to re-test samples with a different analyst, one presumably
capable of testifying at trial, significantly reduces any burden.42 Thus,
by re-testing the sample with an analyst who will be available for crossexamination either before or at trial, the prosecution will probably meet
the requirements announced in Crawford.
Leaning heavily on multiple amicius briefs filed by state prosecutors,
the dissenting justices' repeat attacks were first directed at the majority
opinion in Melendez-Diaz. The dissenting opinion of the instant case
predicts a world in which defense attorneys will object to each forensic
report, and the analysts - beset by other trial obligations - will be

unable to testify. 43 This fear of prosecutorial burden seems to rest
largely on the belief that there are too few analysts to deal with the
demands created by the majority opinion. The dissenting justices do not
mention that the determination of the number of analysts on staff is a
state function of budgetary allocations.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Bullcoming reveal
genuine concerns about the constitutional and practical implications of
each decision. Yet, by creating a paper tiger in the form of prosecutorial
burden, the dissent overestimates the amount of convenience that the
majority opinion actually precludes. This overreach gives the
impression, perhaps unintentionally, that prosecutorial convenience is
an aim, rather than a consequence, of the Sixth Amendment. The
Crawford decision stands for the proposition that the Confrontation
41.

Id.

42.
43.

Id.
Id. at 2728 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Clause of the Sixth Amendment imparts durable and substantial
protections to criminal defendants and that prosecutorial convenience is
a secondary concern.
While the Court's decision in Bullcoming establishes that forensic
analysts are witnesses for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, the
future of forensic analysis is less clear. It is not difficult to imagine that
innovation could produce a device or process that yields immediate
results, eliminating the chain of custody issues that bedevil current Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence. Technological progress, like prosecutorial
convenience, is not a primary factor in Sixth Amendment analysis, a
fact not lost in the Bullcoming majority.

